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Abstract: In a dynamic context, group decisions result as a mixture of agreement and 
compromise. We will put in evidence that an average of judgements of the components, i. e. the 
decision makers, of a committee can be built only if a majority of the members not too different 
opinions. We assume that an external chairman, with a complete information about the state of 
all the components of group, urges or invites decision makers to reach a sufficient consensus. In 
this paper, the judgements of experts are represented by points of a metric space, and the 
consensus is obtained by a dynamical construction of a maximal winning coalition contained in 
a ball with a fixed and suitably small diameter. 
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1. Consensus in Multiagent Decision Making  
Not always the opinions are clearly settled in the individual. Sometimes the opinions are 
uncertain, and can be influenced and modified by other individuals. So, as in a usual discussion 
among the members of a group, especially the experts or decision makers of a committee, it 
happens that the participants modify their points of view, as a consequence of the entering of 
pieces of information, or the opinions expressed by others. Often someone tries to change the 
ideas of the individuals that have different positions in the group, and the reactions are not 
uniform: some individuals defend and confirm their own position, others admit the onset of 
doubts and uncertainties, and others modify, totally or in part, their previous opinions. Moreover 
someone does not want to be emarginated from the group and asks for modify his own opinion 
in the direction of the dominant opinion in the group. [Carlsson et al., 1992; Corrao, 2000]. 
This is related with any description or definition of the behavior of the components in a group 
whose aim is to reach consensus. 
Let us illustrate some reasonable issues that the concept of consensus should meet (see, e. g., 
Carlsson et al.,1992, Eklund et al., 2007).  
Seeking consensus, especially if utility issues are involved, is the result of a trade-off between 
agreement and compromise in the behavior of a single decision maker. This introduces a 
dynamic procedure toward consensus. More precisely, consensus is reached by a group of 
persons that do their best in order to obtain a prefixed goal or a good result in some direction. 
Furthermore, usually group decisions are made by a majority of the members in the committee: 
the more numerous is the majority, the higher is the degree of consensus reached by the group. 
Indeed, unanimous group decisions are rare in real life. 
Moreover seeking consensus requires a perfect information about the behavior of any other 
member at disposal of each member in the group. 
It is assumed that a chairman or supervisor, external to group, coordinates the group decision 
process. In the real life meetings the chairman plays a role such as: he summarizes the 
discussion, thus defining the current status, repeating characteristic opinions, and implicitly 
pointing at contradicting views in diplomatic way, recalling the need to maintain the group. 
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Those who feel being opponents and fear being left out from some majority react by asking to 
clarify or modify their opinions so as to weaken the tension between their own views and what it 
is concluded to be the current state of consensus. 
Our present aim is to exhibit a game theoretic point of view related with the dynamics of a 
consensus reaching process. We look at consensus as a construction of a winning coalition in a 
cooperative game where: 
i) the decision makers are the players; 
ii) utility transfer is allowed; 
iii) only suitable coalitions are admissible. 
 
 
2. A Model of Multiperson Decision Making 
Now we describe a model of collective decision making and the related consensus achievement 
procedure (see also, e. g. Carlsson et al., 1992, and Eklund et al., 2007). 
Let D = {d1, d2, …, dn} be the set of the decision makers of a committee, A = {a1, a2, …, am} the 
set of alternatives, and C = {c1, c2, …, cp} the set of the accepted criteria. Let any decision maker 
dr∈D be able to assess the relevance of each criterion cj with a non negative real number wj(r), 
with the normality conditions: for every r∈{1, 2, …, n}, Σj wj(r) = 1.  
Moreover, for every alternative ai and criterion cj, let sij(r) be the score assessed by the expert dr. 
We assume the sij(r) are real numbers belonging to the interval [0, 1]. 
In order to give a geometrical representation of the preferences of the set of decision makers in 
the geometric space of the alternatives, to every expert dr is associated the point Pr of Rm with 
coordinates: 
 
ui(r) = Σj wj(r) sij(r) , r∈{1, 2, …, m}.                                                                                          (2.1) 
 
Because of the conditions wj(r)∈[0, 1], sij(r)∈[0, 1], Σj wj(r) = 1, every point Pr belongs to the unit 
cube of Rm. 
Dynamics of consensus enhancing process is managed by the chairman by introducing in Rm a 
metric, e. g. the Euclidean metric, that acts between couples of points of Rm associated to 
decision makers. For instance, (see Carlsson et al., 1992, and Eklund et al., 2007), we can 
assume that the distance between the decision makers dr and ds is given by the formula: 
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The supervisor observes, at any step of the decision making process, the position of each 
member in the committee and informs the more peripheral expert about the opportunity to revise 
his judgement.  
If we set d* = max{drs | r, s∈{1, 2, …, n}}, then a measure of the degree of consensus γ can be 
defined as the complement to one of the maximum distance between two positions of the 
experts: 
 
γ = 1-d*=1- max{drs | r, s∈{1, 2, …, n}}.                                                                             (2.3) 
 
The chairman can consider a level δ∈(0, 1) and assume there is consensus if d* < δ, that is γ > 1-
δ. Alternatively, the supervisor can judge that consensus al level δ means that decision makers 
belong to a ball of diameter δ of the metric space Rm. This point of view will be considered in 
the next section. 
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3. Reaching Consensus in a Game Theoretic Point of View 
We describe reaching consensus as a dynamical procedure of movement of points in a metric 
space. We assume that, at every step, the members of the committee D that must reach 
consensus are represented as points of a given metric space (S, d) and that such points can 
change their positions in the successive step. At step h the consensus is obtained if a “sufficient 
number” of members of the committee are contained in a “small ball” of (S, d). Moreover, we 
relate consensus with the construction of a winning coalition in a cooperative game where 
players are decision makers and utility transfer is allowed.  
Let n, n ≥ 3, be the number of decision makers. For every integer k, with n/2< k ≤ n, a set of 
components of the committee with at least k elements is said to be a majority at level k.  
Let now δ be a positive real number, called level of proximity. We say that q members in the 
committee agree at level δ if they belong to a ball of diameter δ of the metric space (S, d).  
We introduce the following definitions: 
• a subset H of D is said to be an admissible coalition, at level δ and at time h, if at step h 
the elements of H are points of (S, d) contained in at least a ball of diameter δ of the 
space; 
• an admissible coalition H is said to be a winning coalition at level k if H is a majority at 
level k. 
The important concept of admissible coalition was considered also by many authors, in 
particular in Luce, Raiffa (1957). Admissibility was related with constraints that were in nature 
ethical, social, etc. Our present point of view is very different because we introduce a 
geometrical interpretation of admissibility concept in order to describe “a sufficient proximity” 
of the components of a coalition. 
We remark that, for every δ >0, the set of admissible coalitions at level δ is not empty because 
every singleton is contained in at least a ball of diameter δ.  
From now on, we assume that the committee D agree on the level of majority k and on the level 
of proximity δ and then in the sequel we don’t recall such levels. 
At step h, let K be the set of the admissible coalitions. A not winning coalition H, whose 
elements are in number of |H|, belonging to K, is said to be: 
 i. losing, if the coalition Hc = D-H∈K contains a winning coalition; 
 ii. quasi-losing, if |Hc| ≥ k, but Hc does not contain any winning coalition; 
 iii. blocking, if |H| < k and |Hc| < k. 
 
The concepts of winning and losing coalitions were studied also in Shapley (1962), where 
simple games are considered. It is worth observing that, while in simple games all coalitions are 
considered admissible, in this paper, we assume as admissible only the coalitions satisfying 
suitable geometric constraints. In particular, in simple games the whole group of players is a 
winning coalition, on the contrary in our framework a coalition with at least k members is 
winning if and only if it is included in a ball of diameter δ. Moreover, we consider the new 
concept of quasi-losing coalition. 
A fundamental difference between the classical, and also fuzzy, game theory and our framework 
is that in the first one minimal winning coalitions are considered (Shapley, (1962), Luce, Raiffa, 
(1957), Mares, (2001)), while in the second one finding the consensus means to look for 
maximal winning coalitions. 
In the sequel, every maximal winning coalition of K is said to be a solution of the consensus 
reaching problem. We introduce the following further 
At step h one of the following cases occurs: 
 (1) D∈K; 
 (2) D∉K, but the consensus problem has a unique solution; 
 (3) D∉K and the consensus problem has at least two solutions; 
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 (4) D∉K and the consensus problem has no solutions. 
Reaching a sufficient consensus can be interpreted as to have a final solution D* that the 
chairman thinks cannot be enlarged in the successive step. Then, in the case (1), a sufficient 
consensus is reached, with the maximum number of elements.  
In the case (2), if H is the unique maximal solution, the chairman either assumes as final solution 
D* = H or tries to enlarge the set D*, by persuading some members of Hc = D-H to change their 
evaluations, that is to move in the metric space (S, d). In the second alternative can happen that 
the players not belonging to the ball of diameter δ containing H don’t move in order to fall in 
this ball, but near to this ball, in such a way to form, with some elements of H, a maximal 
winning coalition H’ not containing H. The aim is to activate a strategy to exclude particular 
elements of H from the final decision.  
In the case (3), the chairman either applies some criteria to choose as final solution D* one 
among the solutions at step h or tries to enlarge consensus by persuading the members of D not 
belonging to all the solutions to change their evaluations.  
Finally, in the case (4), the chairman either tries to persuade the members of D to get closer or 
decides that it is not possible to have a solution of the to consensus problem.  
We call a move at step h every change of evaluation of the members of D not belonging to all the 
solutions. Let Dh = {P1, P2, …, Pn} the set of points of (S, d) that represent the players at step h. 
The set of the n(n-1)/2 real numbers U(Dh) = {d(Pi, Pj), i<j} is the vector distance at step h.  
A function f: [0, +∞)n(n-1)/2→[0, +∞) is said to be an admissibility criterion if it is increasing with 
respect to every variable and it is invariant with respect every permutation of the variables. 
A move from Dh = {P1, P2, …, Pn} to D'h = {P'1, P'2, …, P'n} is said to be admissible, with 
respect to the admissible criterion f and to threshold ε>0, if f(U(D'h)) < f(U(Dh)) - ε.  
Suppose chairman and players agree on an admissibility criterion f and a threshold ε>0. Then the 
chairman decides that there are not possible move if the players are not willing for any 
admissible move.  
A very particular case is the one considered in the papers Carlsson et al., 1992, and Eklund et al., 
2007, that we call the Bastian procedure.  
An alternative to the Bastian procedure is to decide that the maximal winning coalition to 
enlarge is the one with the maximum number of players. If there are more winning coalitions 
with these properties, the coalition to be enlarged is the one, if it is unique, that is included in a 
ball of minimum diameter. 
We can also consider fuzzy coalitions as in Mares (2001), and their fuzzy widths. 
We remark that a serious obstacle in order to obtain a solution can arise by the formation of 
blocking coalitions. Then the existence of blocking coalitions may induce some corrections to 
our procedures, such as an activation of a form of bargaining or an evaluation of the power of 
these coalitions. 
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